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Law	  and	  Lawyers	  in	  a	  World	  After	  Virtue	  
David	  Kennedy	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  central	  figures	  in	  the	  discipline	  of	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  
for	  almost	  four	  decades	  and	  for	  political	  scientists	  like	  me,	  who	  see	  the	  law	  as	  just	  another	  
way	  of	  doing	  politics,	  a	  seminal	  figure	  in	  wresting	  monopolistic	  control	  over	  interpreting	  the	  
law’s	  purpose	  and	  meaning	  away	  from	  professional	  lawyers	  and	  legal	  scholars	  and	  into	  the	  
realm	  where	  people	  are,	  to	  paraphrase	  Austin,	  ‘doing	  things	  with	  words.’	  Pivotal	  to	  this	  
contribution	  has	  been	  Kennedy’s	  willingness	  to	  confront	  trade-­‐offs,	  to	  see	  the	  darker	  
underbelly	  of	  any	  pursuit	  of	  justice,	  moral,	  legal,	  social	  or	  otherwise,	  and	  yet	  to	  remain	  
committed	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  moving	  human	  affairs	  in	  a	  broadly	  progressive	  direction.	  He	  
is	  an	  anti-­‐utopian	  in	  this	  sense,	  an	  anti-­‐sacralizer,	  a	  myth-­‐buster,	  a	  realist	  but	  with	  an	  ethical	  
core.	  The	  antinomies	  of	  modernity	  must	  be	  confronted	  but	  need	  not	  be	  ethically	  disabling.	  
In	  some	  of	  his	  best	  known	  works,	  The	  Rights	  of	  Spring	  and	  The	  Dark	  Sides	  of	  Virtue,	  he	  has	  
even	  drawn	  on	  and	  problematized	  his	  own	  experiences	  of	  being	  an	  expert	  legal	  scholar	  and,	  
if	  not	  quite	  an	  activist,	  then	  certainly	  an	  engaged	  and	  concerned	  participant	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  
human	  rights	  and	  humanitarian	  law.	  In	  A	  World	  of	  Struggle,	  he	  reflects	  more	  systematically	  
on	  his	  many	  encounters	  with	  experts	  and	  expertise,	  including	  his	  own	  experiences	  at	  Davos.	  
This	  distillation	  of	  experience	  and	  contemplation	  focuses	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  lies	  at	  the	  
ethical	  heart	  of	  law	  and	  lawyering.	  This,	  as	  Kennedy	  shows	  at	  length,	  is	  the	  core	  of	  
modernity’s	  challenge.	  
	  
Indeed,	  Max	  Weber	  haunts	  these	  pages.	  In	  many	  ways,	  Kennedy’s	  account	  is	  an	  
anthropology	  of	  the	  everyday	  impact	  of	  the	  very	  legal-­‐rational	  dynamic	  of	  modernity	  that	  
Weber	  so	  brilliantly	  described	  one	  hundred	  years	  ago:	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The	  more	  complicated	  and	  specialized	  modern	  culture	  becomes,	  the	  more	  its	  
external	  supporting	  apparatus	  demands	  the	  personally	  detached	  and	  strictly	  
‘objective’	  expert,	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  master	  of	  older	  social	  structures,	  who	  was	  moved	  by	  
personal	  sympathy	  and	  favor,	  grace	  and	  gratitude.1	  
	  
At	  the	  core	  of	  this	  shift,	  for	  Weber,	  was	  the	  move	  from	  God	  to	  science.	  That	  is,	  from	  a	  
mostly	  subjective	  and	  ostensibly	  personal	  and	  idiosyncratic	  world	  where	  faith	  and	  fate	  
played	  a	  central	  role	  to	  one	  of	  positivism,	  objective	  facts	  and	  statistical	  regularities,	  where	  
traditional	  communities	  gave	  way	  to	  complex	  states	  with	  their	  extraordinary	  range	  of	  
technological	  achievements.2	  A	  shift	  from	  natural	  law	  to	  positive	  law,	  and	  from	  prophecy	  to	  
policy.	  As	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  put	  it	  pithily,	  decades	  earlier:	  ‘All	  that	  is	  solid	  melts	  into	  air,	  all	  
that	  is	  holy	  is	  profaned.’3	  
	  
This	  transformation	  put	  under	  the	  microscope,	  often	  literally,	  the	  dying	  world	  of	  cosmic	  
justice	  and	  divine	  intervention	  and	  replaced	  them	  with	  legal-­‐rational	  authority	  exemplified	  
in	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  state	  bureaucrat.4	  We	  were	  no	  longer	  victims	  of	  destiny	  but	  were	  able	  to	  
know,	  learn	  and	  most	  of	  all	  control	  natural	  and	  social,	  including	  economic,	  life.	  We	  could	  
will	  the	  future.	  What	  followed	  was	  a	  growing	  belief	  in	  the	  power	  of	  rationality	  and	  efficiency	  
in	  administration	  and	  law,	  with	  bureaucracy	  and	  capitalism	  finding	  common	  cause	  around	  
quantification	  and	  calculable	  rules.	  This	  release	  from	  ‘self-­‐incurred	  tutelage,’	  as	  Kant	  put	  it,	  
might	  have	  been	  unavoidable	  but	  it	  also	  meant	  something	  was	  lost	  and	  Weber	  memorably	  
acknowledged	  what:	  ‘The	  fate	  of	  our	  times	  is	  characterized	  by	  rationalization	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  H.	  H.	  Gerth	  and	  C.	  Wright	  Mills,	  From	  Max	  Weber:	  Essays	  in	  Sociology	  (London:	  Routledge	  and	  Kegan	  Paul,	  
1947),	  p.	  216.	  Italics	  in	  original.	  
2	  The	  negative	  implications	  for	  morality	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  turn	  to	  science	  would	  unite	  a	  group	  of	  thinkers	  
including	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre	  and	  Leo	  Strauss	  with	  one	  of	  the	  doyens	  of	  the	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  movement,	  
Roberto	  Unger;	  see	  Stephen	  Holmes,	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Antiliberalism	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  
1993).	  My	  title	  is	  taken,	  obviously,	  from	  MacIntyre’s	  After	  Virtue:	  A	  Study	  in	  Moral	  Theory	  (Notre	  Dame:	  
University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1981).	  
3	  Karl	  Marx	  and	  Friedrich	  Engels,	  The	  Communist	  Manifesto	  (1848),	  chap.	  1.	  
4	  Weber	  is	  interesting	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘professional	  politicians’	  (among	  whom	  lawyers	  are	  prominent)	  who	  
sound	  a	  lot	  like	  today’s	  political	  apparatchiks,	  including	  such	  media	  experts	  as	  ‘spin	  doctors’	  –	  the	  newest	  
professional	  category	  of	  expert	  attaching	  itself	  nominally	  to	  one	  of	  the	  oldest:	  From	  Max	  Weber,	  pp.	  82-­‐85.	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intellectualization	  and,	  above	  all,	  by	  the	  “disenchantment	  of	  the	  world”’5	  	  
	  
We	  no	  longer	  believed	  in	  miracles	  and	  magic.	  The	  mystery	  was	  gone.	  We	  were	  human	  
animals	  who	  held	  our	  destiny	  in	  our	  own	  hands,	  able	  now	  to	  create	  (e.g.,	  penicillin)	  and	  
destroy	  (e.g.,	  nuclear	  power)	  on	  a	  vast	  scale.	  Our	  world	  was	  that	  of	  social	  and	  scientific	  
engineering	  and	  at	  its	  heart,	  in	  the	  era	  of	  rationalized	  authority,	  where	  the	  now	  vanquished	  
old	  Gods	  and	  kings	  once	  dwelt,	  sat	  perhaps	  the	  twentieth	  century’s	  most	  important	  
questions	  about	  legitimate	  rule:	  By	  whom,	  in	  whose	  name,	  by	  what	  right,	  and	  to	  what	  end?	  
The	  decline	  in	  the	  power	  of	  traditional	  religious	  and	  political	  authorities	  democratized	  the	  
sphere	  of	  rulership,	  a	  shift	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  was	  prominent.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
advances	  in	  science	  and	  technology,	  always	  operating	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  state	  bureaucracy	  
and	  money,	  gave	  huge	  power	  to	  bureaucrats	  and	  capitalists	  to	  shape	  every	  aspect	  of	  
contemporary	  life,	  from	  health	  to	  reproduction	  to	  mood	  to	  consumption.	  
	  
Some	  feared	  that	  this	  new	  democratic	  mass	  would	  be	  cannon	  fodder	  for	  a	  rampant	  ‘culture	  
industry’	  that	  would	  turn	  them	  into	  zombies	  by	  feeding	  them	  the	  equivalent	  of	  intellectual	  
valium.6	  Some	  feared	  that	  the	  state’s	  overweening	  power	  would	  herald	  totalitarianism,	  the	  
Nazi	  and	  Soviet	  states	  being	  the	  prime	  examples,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  ‘banal’	  bureaucrat	  
Adolf	  Eichmann	  complaining	  with	  apparent	  sincerity	  that	  he	  had	  been	  highly	  efficient	  at	  
transporting	  Jews	  to	  their	  deaths	  and	  still	  he	  was	  overlooked	  for	  promotion	  by	  his	  SS	  
superiors.7	  Others	  identified	  the	  myriad	  ways	  that	  professional	  expertise	  exercised	  
momentous	  power	  by	  producing	  the	  very	  subjects	  who	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  acting	  and	  
choosing	  in	  this	  brave	  new	  world.8	  	  And	  yet	  there	  was	  a	  parallel	  and	  more	  influential	  strain	  
of	  thought,	  most	  obviously	  in	  the	  newly	  ascendant	  United	  States,	  that	  saw	  great	  potential	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Gerth	  and	  Mills,	  From	  Max	  Weber,	  p.	  155.	  Weber’s	  touchstone	  to	  avoid	  complete	  disorientation	  was	  his	  
attachment	  to	  the	  nation;	  see	  Andreas	  Anter,	  Max	  Weber’s	  Theory	  of	  the	  Modern	  State,	  trans.	  by	  Keith	  Tribe	  
(London:	  Palgrave/Macmillan,	  2014),	  pp.	  124-­‐133.	  	  
6	  Most	  obviously.	  Theodore	  W.	  Adorno	  and	  Max	  Horkheimer,	  Dialectic	  of	  Enlightenment	  (London:	  Verso,	  
1997).	  For	  more	  on	  the	  various	  sceptical	  analyses	  of	  modernity	  by	  non-­‐Marxist	  ‘antiliberals,’	  see	  Holmes,	  The	  
Anatomy	  of	  Antiliberalism.	  
7	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Banality	  of	  Evil	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2006);	  
Zygmunt	  Bauman,	  Modernity	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2000).	  
8	  See	  e.g.,	  Michael	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  1:	  An	  Introduction	  (New	  York,	  Vintage/Random	  House	  
1990).	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the	  rise	  of	  science,	  technology	  and	  rational	  democratic	  administration	  as	  long	  as	  the	  right	  
people	  were	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  machine.	  
	  
The	  modernization	  theorists	  believed	  that	  bureaucracies,	  technical	  experts,	  and	  
social	  engineers	  of	  various	  stripes	  should	  impose	  economic	  and	  political	  order	  on	  
cities,	  nations,	  and	  the	  world.	  Nazism,	  therefore,	  was	  not	  a	  manifestation	  of	  
bureaucracy	  and	  social	  engineering	  gone	  mad,	  but	  rather	  an	  example	  of	  populism	  in	  
power.	  The	  modernization	  theorists	  may	  have	  favored	  democracy,	  but	  only	  insofar	  
as	  it	  involved	  a	  docile	  demos,	  firmly	  subordinated	  to	  “responsible”	  managers.	  
Technocracy	  rather	  than	  “people’s	  liberation”	  was	  what	  modernization	  would	  ideally	  
achieve.	  Despite	  their	  statist	  proclivities,	  modernization	  theorists	  were	  thus	  in	  an	  
important	  sense	  antipolitical:	  politics	  was	  the	  realm	  of	  subjective	  messiness	  rather	  
than	  scientific	  exactitude.9	  
	  
These	  were	  modern	  philosopher-­‐kings,	  floating	  freely	  above	  the	  fray	  of	  politics	  with	  all	  its	  
neediness,	  passion,	  emotion	  and	  self-­‐interest,	  and	  putting	  the	  public’s	  long-­‐term	  interest	  
first	  (whether	  that	  public	  would	  have	  thanked	  them	  for	  it	  or	  not).	  Elite	  rule	  was	  not	  to	  be	  
feared	  but	  to	  be	  encouraged.	  The	  1960s	  may	  have	  seen	  resistance	  from	  the	  new	  left	  
determined	  to	  counter	  the	  culture	  of	  technocracy	  and	  expert	  rule,	  but	  it	  also	  brought	  to	  the	  
fore	  some	  notable	  high	  priests	  of	  modern	  management	  techniques	  like	  Robert	  S.	  
McNamara,	  head	  of	  the	  Ford	  Motor	  Company,	  then	  architect	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  
Carter	  administration	  after	  1977,	  wary	  of	  religious	  evangelism,	  would	  try	  to	  tackle	  this	  fear	  
of	  moral	  disintegration	  in	  a	  disenchanted	  world	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  human	  rights,	  setting	  up	  a	  
tension	  that	  is	  still	  with	  us	  between	  the	  political	  and	  moral	  demand	  for	  rights	  and	  their	  
legalistic	  expression,	  between	  the	  why	  and	  the	  how.10	  
	  
For	  technocrats,	  the	  question,	  to	  recall	  Harold	  Lasswell’s	  description	  of	  politics,	  was	  about	  
‘who	  got	  what,	  when	  and	  how.’	  In	  keeping	  with	  Weber,	  why	  was	  now	  off	  the	  table,	  
foundational	  values	  were	  out,	  and	  technical	  efficiency	  was	  in.	  The	  burgeoning	  reach	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Nils	  Gilman,	  Mandarins	  of	  the	  Future	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  18.	  
10	  Stephen	  Hopgood,	  The	  Endtimes	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (Ithaca,	  MY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  pp.	  98-­‐102.	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markets,	  and	  state	  and	  corporate	  research	  and	  development,	  whether	  for	  medicine,	  energy,	  
transport,	  weapons	  or	  retail,	  meant	  increasing	  specialization	  and	  with	  it	  the	  impossibility	  of	  
mere	  mortals	  understanding	  let	  alone	  contesting	  complex	  economic	  or	  scientific	  claims.	  The	  
days	  when	  an	  amateur	  could	  change	  an	  engine	  or	  even	  fix	  a	  phone	  are	  long	  gone.	  And	  
underwriting	  all	  of	  this	  was	  the	  law,	  particularly	  regulatory	  law.	  This	  rapidly	  growing	  branch	  
of	  legal	  work	  was	  essential	  to	  create	  and	  regulate	  business	  affairs	  once	  welfare	  states	  
divested	  themselves	  of	  control	  over	  key	  public	  utilities	  and	  natural	  monopolies,	  and	  as	  new	  
technology	  and	  financial	  innovation	  created	  vast	  new	  and	  hugely	  complicated	  global	  
markets.11	  Law	  was	  now	  a	  mechanism	  for	  distributing	  resources	  through	  apportioning	  rights	  
to	  economic	  spoils,	  granting	  and	  denying	  access	  to	  markets	  and	  protecting	  profits	  and	  R&D,	  
and	  creating	  (and	  barring)	  access	  to	  political	  power	  (think	  Citizens	  United).	  In	  the	  sphere	  of	  
war,	  law	  had	  long	  regulated	  conflict,	  setting	  limits	  to	  (but	  creating	  opportunities	  for)	  state	  
power.	  Now	  lawyers	  became	  an	  ever-­‐present	  part	  of	  battlefield	  decisions,	  the	  growth	  of	  
conventional	  and	  customary	  law	  creating,	  as	  it	  were,	  specific	  markets	  for	  legitimate	  killing.	  
Generally,	  legalization	  spawned	  a	  vast	  industry	  of	  rules	  and	  their	  privileged	  and	  credentialed	  
legal	  interpreters,	  all	  taking	  a	  slice.	  The	  worlds	  of	  law	  and	  economics	  interacted	  and	  
overlapped	  and	  risk	  became	  the	  dominant	  lens,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  law	  less	  now	  about	  whether	  it	  
was	  right	  or	  wrong	  and	  more	  about	  the	  possible	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  its	  implementation.	  
Which	  brings	  us	  to	  A	  World	  of	  Struggle.	  
	  
Kennedy’s	  argument	  is	  wide-­‐ranging	  in	  its	  implications	  but	  straight-­‐forward	  in	  its	  
conception:	  
	  
Expertise	  is	  special	  knowledge	  made	  real	  as	  authority	  in	  struggle.	  My	  starting	  point	  
for	  exploring	  expertise	  is	  the	  work	  experts	  do	  rather	  than	  the	  specialized	  knowledge	  
they	  bring	  to	  bear.	  Expertise	  is	  less	  a	  form	  of	  knowledge	  deployed	  by	  specialized	  
actors	  than	  a	  form	  of	  knowledge	  work	  undertaken	  by	  all	  kinds	  of	  people	  in	  their	  
relationship	  with	  others.	  Expert	  work	  positions	  the	  people	  who	  do	  it	  between	  what	  
is	  known	  and	  what	  must	  happen.	  The	  work	  is	  interpretive,	  translating	  the	  known	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Steven	  Kent	  Vogel,	  Freer	  Markets,	  More	  Rules:	  Regulatory	  Reform	  in	  Advanced	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  Countries	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into	  action	  and	  knitting	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  back	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  fact.	  One	  
characteristic	  of	  this	  work	  is	  disagreement.	  Experts	  struggle	  with	  one	  another	  using	  
tools	  of	  interpretation,	  articulation,	  and	  persuasion	  that	  are,	  when	  effective,	  at	  once	  
words	  and	  authority	  (p.	  108).	  
	  
We	  may	  be	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  these	  experts	  but	  the	  result	  of	  that,	  argues	  Kennedy,	  is	  both	  
undesirable	  and	  depressingly	  durable.	  	  
	  
The	  global	  political	  and	  economic	  arrangements	  that	  result	  are	  surprisingly	  sturdy	  
for	  all	  the	  talk	  of	  crisis	  and	  worry	  over	  sustainability.	  Terribly	  unjust,	  subject	  to	  crisis,	  
environmentally	  unwise,	  everywhere	  politically	  and	  economically	  captured	  by	  the	  
few,	  and	  yet	  somehow	  impossible	  for	  anyone	  to	  alter	  or	  escape.	  My	  hypothesis	  is	  
that	  this	  stability	  arises	  from	  the	  relative	  invisibility	  and	  imperviousness	  of	  the	  world	  
of	  technical	  management	  to	  contestation	  (	  pp.	  31-­‐32).	  
	  
Why	  is	  the	  great	  game	  of	  expert	  contest	  so	  impervious	  to	  change?	  Why	  do	  we	  not	  storm	  
this	  bastille,	  sluice	  out	  the	  executive	  meeting	  rooms	  and	  expose	  the	  rule	  of	  experts	  to	  the	  
cold	  light	  of	  transparency?	  Is	  this	  because	  we	  are	  not	  a	  ‘we’	  and	  are	  unlikely	  to	  become	  one,	  
remaining	  a	  ‘multitude’	  lacking	  enough	  strategic	  cohesion	  and	  vision	  to	  clamber	  up	  the	  
mountain	  together	  to	  Davos?12	  This	  is	  not	  Kennedy’s	  answer.	  For	  him,	  we	  have	  lost	  track	  of	  
how	  to	  challenge	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  our	  world	  of	  endless	  expert	  policy-­‐making	  other	  
than	  in	  the	  language	  of	  more	  expertise.	  We	  are	  inside	  The	  Matrix.13	  If	  we	  are	  to	  fight	  back	  
we	  need	  champions	  who	  are	  experts	  too	  or	  we’ll	  never	  escape	  the	  cage.	  In	  effect,	  someone	  
needs	  to	  call	  us	  a	  good	  lawyer.	  We	  can	  only	  challenge	  law	  with	  more	  law,	  policy	  with	  more	  
policy,	  economic	  analysis	  with	  economic	  analysis.	  Kennedy	  describes	  this	  vividly:	  
	  
A	  great	  deal	  would	  need	  to	  change	  to	  turn	  all	  this	  around.	  In	  some	  way,	  insiders	  and	  
outsiders	  are	  speaking	  the	  same	  language,	  inhabiting	  opposing	  roles	  in	  a	  common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Multitude:	  War	  and	  Democracy	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Empire	  (London:	  Penguin,	  
2005).	  
13	  The	  Matrix,	  Written	  and	  Directed	  by	  the	  Wachowski	  Brothers	  (Warner	  Bros.,	  1999).	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theater.	  From	  both	  perspectives,	  the	  ways	  power	  operates	  across	  the	  world	  remain	  
obscure.	  The	  missing	  piece,	  I’ve	  come	  to	  believe,	  is	  the	  way	  expert	  ideas	  and	  
professional	  practices	  of	  assertion	  and	  argument	  construct	  and	  reproduce	  a	  world	  of	  
inequality	  and	  injustice.	  In	  world	  affairs,	  expertise	  is	  the	  coin	  of	  the	  realm.	  Whether	  
you	  occupy	  the	  commanding	  heights	  or	  have	  occupied	  Wall	  Street,	  the	  work	  of	  
routine	  reform	  and	  resistance	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  expertise	  (p.	  14).	  
	  
There	  is	  much	  that’s	  intuitively	  persuasive	  about	  this	  analysis.	  In	  the	  fields	  Kennedy	  chooses,	  
economic	  policy	  and	  international	  law,	  it	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  grasp	  the	  ethical	  centre	  at	  all.	  
Nothing	  better	  illustrates	  this	  than	  international	  humanitarian	  law,	  where	  all	  that	  separates	  
the	  ICRC	  and	  military	  lawyers	  are	  often	  who	  wears	  a	  suit	  and	  who	  a	  uniform	  while	  they	  
discuss	  who	  can	  be	  killed	  and	  with	  what	  sort	  of	  gruesome	  weapon	  –	  exploding	  bullets	  are	  
out,	  flame	  throwers	  are	  in.	  Rather	  than	  objecting	  on	  principle	  to	  the	  whole	  business	  of	  
burning	  someone	  alive,	  this	  becomes	  a	  technical	  analysis	  of	  which	  sorts	  of	  horrific	  death	  do	  
or	  do	  not	  accord	  with	  the	  law.	  They	  use	  the	  law	  to	  draw	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  market	  for	  
death.	  As	  Kennedy	  says,	  ‘War	  and	  law	  have	  teamed	  up	  to	  divorce	  politics	  from	  ethical	  
choice	  and	  responsibility	  while	  structuring	  and	  defending	  a	  global	  political	  or	  economic	  
order	  of	  ongoing	  and	  unequal	  struggle…Working	  in	  partnership,	  modern	  law	  and	  modern	  
war	  have	  enforced	  and	  pacified	  the	  boundaries	  of	  today’s	  global	  architecture,	  while	  erasing	  
their	  complicity	  and	  partnership	  with	  power	  and	  evading	  both	  ethical	  and	  political	  
responsibility’	  (p.	  276).	  
	  
This	  represents	  evidence,	  for	  Kennedy,	  of	  the	  empty	  heart	  of	  much	  international	  legal	  
analysis.	  No-­‐one	  asks	  about	  the	  law’s	  validity	  anymore,	  only	  about	  how	  a	  particular	  law	  or	  
analysis	  can	  be	  yoked	  to	  realise	  a	  specific	  goal.	  In	  the	  past	  international	  lawyers	  would	  argue	  
about	  whether	  the	  validity	  of	  law	  lay	  in	  its	  natural,	  that	  is	  moral,	  claims	  or	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
simply	  was	  the	  law	  as	  agreed	  to	  by	  some	  mechanism	  previously	  accepted	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  
that	  law’s	  validity.	  But,	  ‘An	  international	  law	  professional	  today	  ought	  to	  be	  an	  eclectic	  and	  
savvy	  strategist,	  drawing	  on	  all	  these	  theories	  and	  their	  progeny.	  The	  question	  to	  which	  
these	  theories	  respond—what	  makes	  law	  binding	  as	  law—remains	  central	  to	  expert	  
This	  is	  the	  Accepted	  Version	  of	  an	  article	  published	  online	  28	  June	  2016	  by	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  in	  London	  Review	  of	  
International	  Law.	  Please	  refer	  to	  published	  version	  when	  citing,	  available	  at:	  
http://lril.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/06/27/lril.lrw011.extract	  	  
Accepted	  Version	  Downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22669/	  
	  
	  
	   8	  
practice,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  should	  have	  lots	  to	  say	  about	  it,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  
realize	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  answer	  and	  it	  would	  seem	  professionally	  naive	  to	  expect	  there	  
to	  be’	  (p.	  156).	  The	  result	  is	  often	  ‘lawfare,’	  a	  concept	  Kennedy	  has	  been	  prominent	  in	  
popularizing,	  where	  finding	  a	  convenient	  legal	  interpretation	  to	  allow	  (or	  prevent)	  some	  
form	  of	  state	  action	  becomes	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  military	  strategy	  as	  battlefield	  tactics.	  Even	  
President	  Obama	  has	  been	  adept	  at	  this	  as	  a	  Harvard-­‐trained	  lawyer	  once	  taught	  by	  
Kennedy	  himself.14	  
	  
Part	  of	  this	  transformation	  is	  what	  we	  might	  call	  the	  divorce	  of	  word	  from	  world,	  the	  
defining	  characteristic	  of	  our	  era’s	  constructivist	  episteme	  in	  which	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  that	  
anything	  is	  anchored	  in	  the	  ‘real’	  or	  ‘natural’	  worlds,	  moral	  or	  empirical,	  at	  all.	  It’s	  all	  just	  
talk	  (or	  rather	  it’s	  all	  just	  discourse,	  to	  talk	  being	  to	  act).	  We	  live	  in	  a	  world	  of	  social	  
institutions,	  linguistically	  made,	  constructed	  and	  sustained	  by	  recognition	  in	  use.	  The	  idea	  of	  
the	  foundational	  validity	  of	  the	  law	  is	  a	  casualty	  of	  this.	  
	  
Ultimately…an	  international	  legal	  argument	  is	  just	  an	  argument;	  an	  enforcement	  
action	  just	  an	  exercise	  of	  power.	  International	  legal	  theory	  is	  just	  a	  collection	  of	  
arguments	  you	  can	  try	  in	  discussion	  with	  a	  skeptic,	  none	  of	  them	  watertight.	  What	  
makes	  international	  law	  a	  sophisticated	  and	  disenchanted	  profession	  is	  the	  shared	  
realization	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  and	  a	  determination	  to	  forge	  ahead.	  As	  a	  result,	  
international	  law	  is	  best	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  philosophical	  mystery	  to	  be	  solved,	  but	  
as	  a	  profession:	  the	  work	  of	  people	  who	  animate	  the	  practices,	  norms,	  and	  ideas	  
that	  have	  been	  gathered	  in	  its	  name.	  What	  holds	  the	  field	  together	  is	  a	  professional	  
identity	  that	  is	  part	  shared	  faith	  in	  international	  law’s	  usefulness	  and	  long-­‐term	  
potential,	  part	  practice	  of	  fealty	  and	  strategic	  engagement	  on	  behalf	  of	  that	  faith,	  
and	  part	  shared	  sensibility	  or	  posture	  aligning	  these	  ethical	  commitments	  and	  
pragmatic	  strategies	  (p.	  242).	  
	  
We	  return	  to	  disenchantment	  and	  faith	  shortly.	  First,	  let	  us	  note	  that	  in	  this	  modern	  legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	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disenchantment	  we	  see	  how	  the	  dilemmas	  Weber	  outlines	  begin	  to	  bite	  hard.	  If	  it	  is,	  as	  
Kennedy	  argues,	  one	  argument	  (one	  legal	  opinion)	  against	  another,	  then	  the	  question	  
‘which	  of	  us	  is	  right’	  is	  the	  wrong	  one	  to	  ask.	  What	  matters	  is	  who	  wins.	  We	  prize	  experts	  for	  
their	  facility	  in	  helping	  us	  get	  what	  we	  want.	  There	  is	  no	  place	  for	  the	  why	  question,	  the	  
what’s	  it	  all	  for	  question.	  Every	  expert	  intervention	  is	  just	  a	  move	  in	  the	  great	  ‘war	  of	  
position’	  as	  Gramsci	  might	  have	  put	  it.	  It	  matters	  less	  whether	  something	  is	  true	  than	  that	  it	  
can	  be	  made	  to	  seem	  true,	  whether	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  climate	  change,	  the	  negative	  
effects	  of	  smoking	  or	  the	  causes	  of	  gun	  violence.	  Therein	  lies	  the	  difference	  between	  facts	  
and	  social	  facts,	  the	  latter	  only	  true	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  treated	  as	  true.	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  here	  something	  that	  Kennedy	  at	  times	  glosses.	  While	  we	  may	  
be	  sceptical	  about	  all	  claims	  to	  universal,	  objective,	  impartial	  knowledge,	  the	  capacity	  (as	  in	  
having	  the	  requisite	  characteristics)	  to	  make	  such	  claims	  –	  to	  stake	  out	  the	  moral	  or	  
scientific	  high-­‐ground	  –	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  struggle.	  And	  only	  some	  can	  successfully	  
do	  it.	  In	  my	  own	  work	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  Amnesty	  International	  as	  an	  
elaborately	  organised	  way	  to	  do	  precisely	  this,	  establish	  the	  foundations	  for	  a	  claim	  that	  
there	  is	  universal	  moral	  knowledge	  available	  to	  intuition,	  one	  singular,	  true	  answer	  to	  
questions	  about	  what	  is	  right	  and	  wrong.15	  Not	  everyone	  can	  successfully	  make	  an	  attempt	  
to	  substantiate	  this	  claim	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  preconditions	  for	  claiming	  universal	  
authority.	  This	  introduces	  a	  diversity,	  even	  a	  hierarchy,	  into	  kinds	  of	  expertise	  and	  forms	  of	  
knowledge	  which	  Kennedy	  can	  at	  times	  overlook	  because	  he	  focuses	  on	  experts	  as	  a	  general	  
category	  more	  than	  on	  specific	  kinds	  of	  expertise.	  
	  
This	  leads	  to	  a	  further	  reservation	  about	  specific	  expertise.	  Can	  claims	  made	  by	  scientific	  
experts	  (about	  antibiotic	  resistance	  or	  the	  properties	  of	  graphite	  or	  drug	  treatments	  for	  
cancer)	  be	  as	  easily	  rejected	  as	  those	  made	  by	  lawyers?	  Some	  forms	  of	  expertise	  and	  expert	  
have	  more	  convincing	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  in	  their	  backpacks	  (a	  favourite	  Kennedy	  
metaphor)	  than	  others.	  You	  can	  always	  get	  another	  legal	  opinion	  and	  while	  you	  can	  always	  
get	  another	  scientific	  opinion	  (think	  quantum	  mechanics),	  the	  barrier	  to	  being	  taken	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  Stephen	  Hopgood,	  Keepers	  of	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  NY:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  2006).	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seriously	  is	  significantly	  higher.	  The	  germ	  theory	  of	  disease	  prevailed	  in	  the	  end	  as	  did	  anti-­‐
smoking	  advocates	  whose	  lawyers	  used	  expert	  scientific	  evidence	  to	  win	  out	  against	  the	  
lawyers	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  In	  an	  analogous	  way,	  the	  cautionary	  tale	  of	  the	  medical	  
technology	  company	  Theranos	  reminds	  us	  that	  most	  savvy	  investors	  with	  biotech	  PhDs	  on	  
their	  boards	  wouldn’t	  touch	  the	  company	  with	  a	  barge	  pole	  because	  there	  was	  ‘so	  much	  
hand	  waving’	  and	  not	  enough	  hard	  data	  and	  scientific	  expertise.16	  Some	  professions	  have	  a	  
higher	  bullshit	  threshold	  than	  others.	  Thus	  Kennedy’s	  argument	  might	  say	  more	  about	  
lawyers,	  and	  perhaps	  lawyers	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  than	  about	  expertise	  per	  se.	  
	  
Looking	  at	  science	  or	  medicine	  certainly	  presents	  a	  more	  upbeat	  view	  of	  modernity’s	  
possibilities:	  that	  the	  capacity	  for	  rational	  communication	  and	  collective	  endeavour	  holds	  
some	  promise	  that	  ‘we,’	  whoever	  ‘we’	  are,	  might	  work	  out	  a	  path	  forward	  together.	  
Otherwise,	  we	  are	  trapped	  within	  a	  soulless	  game	  of	  winning	  and	  losing,	  of	  billable	  hours	  
and	  the	  self-­‐aggrandizing	  pursuit	  of	  cultural	  capital.	  It	  becomes	  a	  sport	  where	  instrumental	  
skill	  is	  prized.	  This	  was	  Weber’s	  prediction	  for	  acquisitive	  Protestant	  culture	  once	  it	  lost	  
touch	  with	  the	  signs	  of	  grace	  that	  had	  been	  the	  point	  of	  showing	  self-­‐restraint	  and	  
asceticism	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Capitalism	  was	  now	  loosed	  from	  its	  moorings.	  
…the	  idea	  of	  duty	  in	  one’s	  calling	  prowls	  about	  in	  our	  lives	  like	  the	  ghost	  of	  dead	  
religious	  beliefs.	  Where	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  calling	  cannot	  directly	  be	  related	  to	  the	  
highest	  spiritual	  and	  cultural	  values,	  or	  when,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  need	  not	  be	  felt	  
simply	  as	  economic	  compulsion,	  the	  individual	  generally	  abandons	  the	  attempt	  to	  
justify	  it	  at	  all.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  its	  highest	  development,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  
pursuit	  of	  wealth,	  stripped	  of	  its	  religious	  and	  ethical	  meaning,	  tends	  to	  become	  
associated	  with	  purely	  mundane	  passions,	  which	  often	  actually	  give	  it	  the	  character	  
of	  sport.17	  
If	  there	  is	  no	  shared	  purpose,	  and	  experts	  are	  trapped	  into	  this	  disenchanted	  but	  high-­‐
functioning	  sporting	  contest	  marked	  by	  instrumentalism	  and	  competition	  –	  what	  we	  might	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Randall	  Stross,	  ‘Don’t	  blame	  Silicon	  Valley	  for	  Theranos,’	  New	  York	  Times,	  April	  27	  2016.	  
17	  Max	  Weber,	  The	  Protestant	  Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism	  (London:	  Routledge	  Classics,	  2001),	  p.	  124.	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call	  the	  Goldman/McKinsey/DLA	  Piper	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  where	  time	  is	  money,	  and	  
everything	  is	  business	  –	  how	  might	  expectant	  and	  principled	  young	  lawyers	  rescue	  
themselves?	  One	  answer	  could	  be	  to	  forsake	  private	  practice	  for	  public,	  international	  and	  
human	  rights	  law	  but	  this	  is	  far	  from	  immune,	  as	  Kennedy	  shows,	  from	  instrumentalism.	  
Another	  might	  be	  to	  forsake	  government,	  for	  the	  iron	  logic	  of	  the	  state’s	  need	  to	  prevail	  will	  
ultimately	  catch	  you	  as	  will	  your	  candidate’s	  need	  to	  up	  protect	  her	  poll	  numbers	  to	  get	  
elected.	  But	  aren’t	  the	  ICRC	  and	  the	  Pentagon	  both	  playing	  lawfare,	  just	  from	  opposite	  
sides?	  Kennedy’s	  answer	  lies	  in	  an	  attachment	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  responsibility,	  expressed	  
through	  its	  negation:	  ‘The	  lost	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  expertise	  as	  a	  doorway	  to	  responsible	  
decision	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  ethical	  reflection	  and	  political	  choice	  is	  dramatically	  
on	  display	  in	  the	  increasing	  legalization	  of	  military	  conflict’	  (p.	  13).	  
	  
Responsibility	  can	  be	  exercised,	  in	  other	  words,	  within	  the	  game.	  There	  are	  better	  and	  
worse	  decisions,	  from	  an	  ethical	  point	  of	  view.	  Take	  lawfare,	  for	  example.	  Jack	  Goldsmith,	  a	  
conservative	  lawyer	  appointed	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Justice	  Department’s	  Office	  of	  Legal	  Counsel	  
(OLC)	  in	  2003	  under	  President	  George	  W	  Bush,	  was	  faced	  on	  taking	  office	  with	  legal	  
opinions	  that	  supported	  what	  President	  Obama	  and	  Congress	  would	  later	  openly	  call	  
torture:	  
	  
As	  I	  absorbed	  the	  opinions,	  I	  concluded	  that	  some	  were	  deeply	  flawed:	  sloppily	  
reasoned,	  overbroad,	  and	  incautious	  is	  asserting	  extraordinary	  constitutional	  
authorities	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  President.	  I	  was	  astonished,	  and	  immensely	  worried,	  to	  
discover	  that	  some	  of	  our	  most	  important	  counterterrorism	  policies	  rested	  on	  
severely	  damaged	  legal	  foundations.	  It	  began	  to	  dawn	  on	  me	  that	  I	  could	  not	  –	  as	  I	  
thought	  I	  would	  eventually	  be	  asked	  to	  do	  –	  stand	  by	  or	  reaffirm	  these	  opinions.18	  
	  
On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  this	  looks	  like	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  moral	  limit	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
law.	  And	  yet,	  as	  Goldsmith	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  in	  explaining	  why	  he	  did	  not	  resign,	  he	  decided	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Jack	  Goldsmith,	  The	  Terror	  Presidency:	  Law	  and	  Judgment	  Inside	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  
Norton	  and	  Co,	  2009),	  p.	  10.	  
This	  is	  the	  Accepted	  Version	  of	  an	  article	  published	  online	  28	  June	  2016	  by	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  in	  London	  Review	  of	  
International	  Law.	  Please	  refer	  to	  published	  version	  when	  citing,	  available	  at:	  
http://lril.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/06/27/lril.lrw011.extract	  	  
Accepted	  Version	  Downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22669/	  
	  
	  
	   12	  
‘try	  to	  fix	  the	  opinions	  that	  a	  sound	  legal	  analysis	  would	  support.’19	  A	  ‘sound	  legal	  analysis’?	  
This	  could	  mean	  that	  the	  opinions	  were	  just	  bad	  law	  in	  that	  they	  were	  poorly	  anchored	  in	  
their	  sources	  and	  thus	  of	  dubious	  validity.	  This	  implies	  that	  if	  a	  better	  anchored	  legal	  
opinion	  had	  been	  possible	  it	  might	  then	  have	  better	  justified	  so-­‐called	  ‘enhanced	  
interrogation	  techniques.’	  Or	  it	  could	  mean	  that	  legal	  opinions	  sanctioning	  waterboarding	  
were	  in	  fact	  justification	  for	  illegal	  actions	  that	  broke	  both	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  and	  
American	  domestic	  law	  and	  could	  never	  be	  accepted	  as	  binding	  law.	  In	  any	  event,	  
Goldsmith,	  for	  one	  of	  these	  reasons,	  did	  what	  one	  assumes	  Kennedy	  would	  say	  was	  the	  
‘responsible’	  thing	  and	  retracted	  the	  offending	  opinions	  (all	  under	  the	  watchful	  eyes	  of	  a	  
portrait	  of	  Attorney	  General	  Elliot	  Richardson	  who	  defied	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  demand	  to	  fire	  
Watergate	  special	  prosecutor	  Archibald	  Cox).	  But	  if,	  in	  the	  process,	  the	  principle	  of	  torture	  
was	  not	  repudiated	  then	  the	  main	  charge	  is	  bad	  lawyering	  –	  a	  failure	  of	  expertise	  –	  not	  a	  
moral	  failure	  as	  Congress	  would	  later	  allege	  in	  its	  Torture	  Report.	  
	  
Responsibility	  is	  one,	  slim	  hope.	  Aren’t	  there	  also	  political	  limits	  to	  the	  creativity	  of	  expert	  
lawyers?	  Kennedy	  at	  times	  sees	  everyone	  as	  an	  expert,	  even	  politicians.	  
	  
It	  would	  be	  better	  to	  imagine	  expert	  “deciders”	  and	  expert	  “advisors”	  in	  dialog	  with	  
one	  another,	  their	  positions	  marked	  by	  their	  use	  of	  different	  fields	  of	  knowledge	  or	  
different	  styles	  of	  argument.	  The	  advisor	  might,	  for	  example,	  speak	  the	  language	  of	  
development	  policy,	  the	  leader	  a	  language	  of	  political	  ideology	  or	  interest	  (p.	  137).	  
	  
But	  here	  we	  confront	  questions	  of	  power	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  experts	  elides.	  Kennedy’s	  view	  
of	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  and	  expertise	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  following	  observation:	  
‘Precisely	  because	  it	  is	  a	  two-­‐way	  street—my	  ideas	  legitimate	  your	  power,	  your	  power	  
enforces	  my	  ideas—the	  exercise	  of	  power,	  even	  as	  brute	  force,	  occurs	  within	  a	  discursive	  
world	  of	  meaning.	  Ideas,	  ideologies,	  and	  myths	  are	  able	  to	  legitimate	  only	  when	  they	  are	  
hegemonic	  across	  people	  with	  the	  power	  to	  halt	  or	  support	  that	  exercise	  of	  power.	  
Understood	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  operations	  of	  power	  are	  expertise	  all	  around’	  (p.	  9).	  But	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Goldsmith,	  The	  Terror	  Presidency,	  p.	  11.	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clouds	  the	  issue.	  
	  
State	  bureaucrats,	  prima	  facie	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  prevail,	  often	  and	  predictably,	  whether	  
through	  money,	  law,	  other	  arms	  of	  the	  state,	  special	  access	  to	  the	  media,	  to	  important	  
strategic	  information	  and	  to	  justificatory	  rhetorical	  claims	  like	  ‘the	  national	  interest.’	  
However	  genuinely	  engaged	  in	  a	  conversation	  about	  drug	  policy	  or	  counterterrorism	  they	  
might	  be,	  in	  the	  end	  they	  will	  have	  a	  decision	  to	  make,	  or	  to	  recommend,	  and	  one	  that	  will	  
involve	  political	  as	  well	  as	  scientific	  calculations	  (a	  decision	  that	  will	  not	  necessarily	  come	  
down	  to	  the	  best	  possible	  public	  interest	  argument).	  They	  are	  super-­‐ordinary	  experts,	  in	  
other	  words,	  experts	  with	  an	  extra	  dose	  of	  juice.	  Some	  experts	  are	  more	  equal	  than	  others	  
regardless	  of	  how	  well	  they	  play	  the	  game.	  
	  
Above	  them,	  of	  course,	  sit	  decision-­‐makers.	  These	  people	  too	  can	  sound	  like	  experts	  in	  
Kennedy’s	  rendering	  but	  they’re	  really	  not:	  elected	  politicians	  (or	  monarchs	  and	  autocrats),	  
corporate	  titans	  and	  fabulously	  wealthy	  individuals	  and	  families,	  all	  play	  a	  significant,	  even	  
determining,	  role	  in	  Kennedy’s	  ‘struggle’	  but	  none	  is	  really	  caught	  by	  the	  loosely	  thrown	  net	  
of	  expertise.	  They	  may	  act	  based	  on	  gut	  instinct,	  rank	  prejudice,	  flawed	  reasoning,	  passion	  
and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly	  of	  all	  naked	  self-­‐interest	  and	  unfettered	  desire.	  There	  is	  the	  
hint	  of	  redemptive	  potential	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  something	  remains	  pure	  about	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  
expert,	  cleaving	  to	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  best	  way	  to	  argue	  a	  particular	  problem	  in	  law,	  or	  to	  
protect	  the	  profits	  of	  her	  clients,	  but	  not	  morally	  tarnished	  in	  her	  soul.	  She	  doesn’t	  own	  the	  
capital	  and	  she	  is	  only	  following	  orders.	  It	  is	  her	  boss	  who	  makes	  the	  call.	  To	  quote	  Margaret	  
Thatcher:	  ‘Don’t	  tell	  me	  what,	  I	  know	  what.	  Tell	  me	  how.’20	  In	  other	  words,	  use	  your	  skills	  to	  
get	  me	  what	  I	  want:	  more	  power,	  more	  influence,	  more	  money,	  a	  bigger	  market,	  a	  won	  war,	  
world	  domination.	  
	  
The	  current	  shock	  and	  horror	  about	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  oldest	  professions,	  tax	  lawyers,	  
helping	  wealthy	  clients	  hide	  cash	  from	  the	  prying	  eyes	  of	  states	  helps	  to	  re-­‐emphasize	  just	  
how	  important	  the	  law	  is	  to	  greasing	  just	  this	  one	  small	  aspect	  of	  the	  world’s	  arterial	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  John	  Campbell,	  Margaret	  Thatcher,	  Volume	  1:	  The	  Grocer’s	  Daughter	  (London:	  Vintage	  Books,	  2007),	  p.	  366.	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of	  rich	  people’s	  money.	  There	  is	  a	  political	  economy	  beyond	  expertise	  that	  patterns	  real	  
world	  outcomes	  in	  consistent	  and	  predictable	  ways,	  in	  other	  words.	  Which	  experts	  win,	  
whether	  in	  court	  cases,	  over	  tax	  liabilities,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  facilitating	  the	  state’s	  security	  
projects,	  is	  far	  less	  open	  to	  competition	  than	  Kennedy’s	  picture	  might	  suggest.	  As	  Americans	  
wake	  up	  to	  stagnant	  real	  wages	  for	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  a	  rising	  share	  of	  wealth	  for	  the	  1%	  
and	  their	  children	  and	  their	  children’s	  children	  they	  have	  begun	  to	  work	  out	  what	  any	  
Marxist	  would	  have	  told	  them	  decades	  ago	  –	  that	  the	  game	  is	  rigged,	  as	  support	  for	  anti-­‐
establishment	  candidates	  like	  Donald	  Trump	  and	  Bernie	  Sanders	  suggests,	  and	  that	  experts,	  
for	  which	  read	  lawyers,	  bankers	  and	  management	  consultants,	  are	  the	  shock	  troops.	  
	  
Which	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  strongest	  argument	  against	  Kennedy’s	  thesis	  –	  that	  his	  never-­‐ending	  
struggle	  is	  ending,	  not	  in	  the	  victory	  for	  one	  set	  of	  experts	  over	  others	  but	  in	  a	  repudiation	  
by	  the	  demos	  at	  large	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  elite	  experts	  in	  its	  entirety.	  As	  Peter	  Finch’s	  character	  
Howard	  Beale	  so	  indelibly	  puts	  it	  in	  Network:	  ‘I’m	  as	  mad	  as	  hell	  and	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  take	  
this	  anymore.’	  There	  are	  protest	  candidates	  from	  the	  right	  concerned	  about	  the	  erosion	  of	  
national	  communities	  and	  traditional	  values,	  protest	  candidates	  from	  the	  left	  who	  worry	  
about	  lost	  jobs	  and	  the	  unaccountable	  decisions	  of	  central	  bankers	  and	  the	  scions	  of	  Wall	  
Street,	  protest	  candidates	  from	  the	  centre	  who	  bemoan	  the	  devastation	  of	  the	  environment	  
and	  the	  curtailment	  of	  civil	  liberties.	  In	  almost	  all	  mature	  democracies,	  increasing	  numbers	  
of	  voters	  call	  themselves	  independents	  while	  assertive	  social	  protest	  movements	  mobilize	  in	  
ever	  greater	  numbers	  on	  issues	  like	  immigration,	  corruption	  and	  economic	  inequality.	  
	  
There	  has	  always	  been	  a	  tension	  between	  experts	  and	  the	  people.	  The	  problem	  of	  
democracy,	  for	  an	  expert	  elite,	  was	  what	  to	  do	  when	  the	  people	  wouldn’t	  listen	  to	  reason.	  
Modernization	  theorists	  feared	  the	  ‘irrational	  demos’	  as,	  in	  foreign	  policy	  terms,	  realist	  did	  
too.	  The	  neocons	  might	  be	  advocates	  for	  democracy	  but	  they	  have	  a	  healthy	  Strauss-­‐like	  
respect	  for	  elite	  rule.	  Experts	  in	  this	  world	  of	  governance	  have	  worked	  for	  decades	  within	  a	  
context	  (Kennedy’s	  word),	  that	  gives	  them	  unrivaled	  access	  to	  power	  and	  authority	  in	  
making	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  public	  policy	  decisions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  legal-­‐rational	  criteria.	  This	  
context	  is	  comprised	  by	  the	  sedimented	  background	  assumptions	  that	  are	  now	  orthodoxy,	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received	  opinion,	  the	  world	  of	  natural	  facts	  and	  common-­‐sense	  that	  provides	  an	  outer	  
frame	  to	  everyday	  expert	  competition.	  These	  assumptions	  have	  been	  challenged	  –	  on	  
gender,	  class,	  race,	  morality,	  sexuality,	  justice,	  freedom	  –	  as	  long	  as	  there	  have	  been	  experts	  
to	  interpret	  and	  defend	  settled	  opinion.	  What	  I’m	  suggesting	  is	  that	  the	  pendulum	  might	  be	  
shifting	  towards	  more	  radical	  change.	  Why	  do	  we	  incarcerate	  so	  many	  people,	  should	  drugs	  
be	  legalized,	  are	  the	  police	  racist,	  is	  the	  state	  patriarchal,	  why	  is	  there	  persistent	  structural	  
inequality,	  why	  can’t	  refugees	  expect	  sanctuary	  in	  other	  states,	  how	  will	  we	  save	  the	  
climate,	  why	  are	  we	  fighting	  an	  endless	  war?	  These	  questions,	  often	  asked,	  have	  now	  got	  
people	  mobilized.	  The	  contours	  of	  expertise	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  shift	  as	  a	  result.	  We	  are	  
trapped	  no	  longer	  within	  the	  set	  of	  normative	  structures	  which	  make	  it	  hard	  to	  unthink	  
what	  we	  know	  and	  think	  something	  different.	  When	  the	  dust	  settles,	  new	  experts	  might	  
arise.	  But	  their	  context	  will	  be	  very	  different	  and	  maybe	  their	  outlook	  will	  be	  too.	  Or	  
perhaps	  it	  will	  be	  a	  world	  of	  radical	  democracy,	  of	  more	  anarchy,	  one	  where	  devolved	  
networks	  of	  governance	  and	  consensus-­‐making	  proliferate,	  a	  world	  in	  which	  it	  is	  the	  demos	  
that	  speaks	  and	  acts	  according	  to	  its	  own	  collective	  analysis	  of	  what’s	  required.	  
	  
This	  shift	  could	  be	  revolutionary.	  It	  will	  not	  (necessarily)	  be	  progressive	  of	  course,	  and	  it	  may	  
represent	  very	  different	  currents	  of	  change	  than	  Weber’s	  vision	  of	  modernity.	  Revitalized	  
religious	  intensity	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Christianity,	  Charismatic	  Catholicism,	  
Hindutva,	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  the	  Islamic	  State	  are	  just	  as	  much	  radical	  
responses	  to	  ‘business	  as	  usual’	  (that	  is,	  a	  world	  run	  by	  secularized	  Western	  expert	  elites).	  
These	  new	  prophets	  are	  waging	  a	  different	  struggle	  and	  are	  taking	  things	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  
of	  Kennedy’s	  experts	  entirely.	  Concerns	  about	  the	  overly	  professionalized	  and	  corporatized	  
world	  of	  global	  human	  rights	  and	  humanitarianism	  are	  further	  examples	  of	  an	  awareness	  
that	  the	  rule	  of	  experts	  is	  threatened.	  One	  recent	  report	  on	  humanitarianism’s	  future	  was	  
titled	  Time	  to	  Let	  Go.21	  This	  might	  be	  an	  epitaph	  for	  expert	  rule.	  
	  
It’s	  unlikely,	  of	  course,	  that	  any	  embedded	  expert	  is	  going	  to	  go	  so	  quietly.	  Identified	  with	  
the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  ancien	  regime,	  they	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  by	  throwing	  in	  their	  lot	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Overseas	  Development	  Institute/Humanitarian	  Policy	  Group,	  Time	  to	  Let	  Go:	  Remaking	  Humanitarian	  Action	  
for	  the	  Modern	  Era	  (London:	  ODI,	  2016).	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the	  revolutionaries	  as	  by	  ganging	  together	  with	  the	  established	  powers	  and	  defending	  their	  
interests.	  They	  might	  tough	  it	  out	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  feeling	  that	  Beale	  
articulates	  so	  poignantly	  in	  Network:	  That	  the	  powers	  that	  be,	  the	  experts,	  are	  not	  listening	  
to	  us.	  In	  the	  end	  ‘the	  people’	  simply	  is	  sovereign	  in	  any	  but	  the	  most	  totalitarian	  system;	  
collective	  action	  problems	  aside,	  there	  are	  just	  so	  many	  of	  them	  (or	  us).	  
	  
Because	  the	  law	  is	  really	  politics	  this	  is	  a	  fitting	  result,	  a	  lifting	  of	  the	  veil,	  a	  sudden	  moment	  
of	  clarity	  like	  Mohamed	  Bouazizi’s	  self-­‐immolation.	  As	  Kennedy	  puts	  it:	  ‘Although	  experts	  
routinely	  imagine	  their	  work	  as	  a	  technical	  and	  pragmatic	  practice	  at	  least	  aspirationally	  
removed	  from	  conflict	  and	  political	  contestation,	  the	  idea	  that	  “politics”	  is	  somehow	  
different	  is	  its	  own	  kind	  of	  expert	  fantasy’	  (p.	  3).	  The	  end	  of	  this	  fantasy	  means	  the	  return	  of	  
the	  political,	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  between	  the	  holders	  of	  power	  and	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  
make	  it	  more	  genuinely	  accountable.	  In	  this	  existential	  slow-­‐motion	  clash,	  if	  it	  comes,	  
experts	  will	  be	  like	  fleeing	  tax	  lawyers	  looking	  for	  a	  haven	  of	  their	  own.	  How	  will	  they	  
understand	  the	  rage?	  
	  
Kennedy	  acknowledges	  that,	  ‘The	  modern	  international	  legal	  profession	  is	  a	  case	  study	  of	  
sophistication	  through	  disenchantment.’	  (p.	  220).	  They	  rule	  but	  they	  do	  not	  enjoy	  it.	  In	  his	  
introduction,	  he	  notes	  Unger’s	  description	  of	  modern	  experts	  as	  a	  ‘priesthood	  that	  had	  lost	  
their	  faith	  and	  kept	  their	  jobs,’	  standing	  in	  ‘tedious	  embarrassment	  before	  cold	  altars.’22	  A	  
World	  of	  Struggle	  is	  a	  dialogue	  with	  this	  grim	  conclusion	  from	  one	  of	  Kennedy’s	  esteemed	  
forerunners.	  We	  are	  back	  with	  Weber	  on	  the	  protestant	  ethic	  as	  sport,	  his	  famous	  
description	  of	  those	  caught	  in	  the	  cycle	  of	  competition	  without	  recourse	  to	  foundational	  
values	  as	  ‘specialists	  without	  spirit,	  sensualists	  without	  heart;	  this	  nullity	  imagines	  that	  it	  has	  
attained	  a	  level	  of	  civilization	  never	  before	  achieved.’23	  Is	  this	  where	  modern	  lawyers	  are?	  
Even	  human	  rights	  and	  humanitarian	  lawyers?	  Kennedy	  sees	  legal	  experts	  as	  having	  lost	  
their	  ethical	  centre	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  retaining	  an	  unarticulated	  faith	  in	  their	  own	  
rectitude	  (despite	  their	  often	  instrumental	  cynicism).	  He	  channels	  Weber:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Roberto	  Unger,	  ‘The	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  Movement,’	  96	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  561,	  pp.	  674-­‐76	  (1983),	  as	  
quoted	  in	  Kennedy,	  A	  World	  of	  Struggle,	  p.	  20.	  
23	  Weber,	  The	  Protestant	  Ethic,	  p.	  124.	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International	  lawyers	  can	  hardly	  avoid	  coming	  face-­‐to-­‐	  face	  with	  the	  diversity	  and	  
analytic	  porousness	  of	  their	  expertise.	  Such	  an	  experience	  of	  legal	  pluralism	  might	  
open	  the	  way	  to	  exploring	  law’s	  role	  in	  distributive	  conflict	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
legal	  experts	  for	  the	  outcomes	  of	  struggle.	  By	  and	  large,	  however,	  this	  has	  not	  
happened.	  Instead,	  international	  lawyers	  have	  transformed	  pluralism	  into	  another	  
tool	  for	  technical	  managers,	  bypassing	  its	  radical	  potential.	  The	  fragmentation	  and	  
pluralization	  of	  the	  field	  have	  focused	  the	  attention	  of	  experts	  forward	  on	  the	  future	  
world-­‐ordering	  potential	  of	  law	  and	  the	  prefigurative	  quality	  of	  its	  current	  
institutional	  expressions	  without	  noticing	  its	  implication	  in	  contemporary	  
dysfunction	  and	  injustice.	  The	  attitude	  that	  results,	  at	  once	  ethically	  confident	  and	  
practically	  disenchanted,	  is	  inhabited	  in	  a	  way	  reminiscent	  of	  sensibilities	  for	  
accommodating	  both	  belief	  and	  doubt	  within	  a	  practice	  of	  faith	  in	  Protestant	  
religious	  traditions	  with	  which	  I	  am	  familiar	  (pp.	  12-­‐13).	  
	  
‘To	  ask	  how	  hegemony	  arises	  is	  to	  participate	  in	  its	  erosion,’	  says	  Kennedy	  (p.	  37).	  One	  is	  
tempted	  to	  respond	  that	  turkeys	  do	  not	  vote	  for	  Thanksgiving.	  The	  revolution	  is	  more	  likely	  
to	  begin	  with	  the	  involuntary	  removal	  of	  the	  lawyers,	  a	  common	  populist	  cry.	  It	  will	  not	  be	  
enough	  to	  shout	  ‘but	  I’m	  a	  human	  rights	  lawyer’	  as	  the	  crowd	  carries	  you	  away.	  Getting	  
lawyers,	  academics,	  economists,	  scientists,	  to	  see	  their	  –	  our	  –	  own	  complicity	  in	  a	  world	  
drifting	  deeper	  into	  ecological	  and	  social	  crisis	  might	  be	  a	  start.	  Some	  of	  us	  may	  be	  saved.	  A	  
World	  of	  Struggle	  is	  a	  call	  to	  set	  out	  on	  that	  journey,	  not	  in	  the	  language	  of	  condemnation	  
but	  in	  Kennedy’s	  self-­‐reflective,	  agonized,	  even	  Stoic	  company.	  He	  is,	  after	  all,	  an	  expert	  too.	  
	  
